Coping with Intolerance and Separatism in Indonesia

The Pancasila Principles

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Abstract

The Bandung Principles do emphasize an open dialogue based on mutual respect. This standard applies in the international relations between countries in post-colonial Asia and Africa. It is also relevant as a value for building peaceful relations between ethnic or religious groups at the nation-state level. The principles of 'Pancasila' can be perceived as the translation of the Bandung Principles. The Indonesian state ideology aims to an open dialogue as a strategy for coping with the national ethnoreligious – and secessionist conflicts. The political changes in 1998, resulting in the resignation of president Suharto, demonstrated however an approach by local elites to protect their political and economic interests through activating ethnic or religion-based primordial sentiments. The communal violence between religious or ethnic groups continued with the persecution of minority religious groups, emerging in 2004. Since then, step by step the conflicts were fueled by religious intolerance and radicalism. This article aims to describe to what extent the ideology of Pancasila is valuable as a conceptual framework to overcome religious intolerance and separatist conflicts in a national context while promoting the values of plurality in a diverse society. The analysis reflects critically on the applications of the principles of Pancasila and their limits for religious, political, economic and social cohesion. It is argued that Pancasila has shortcomings in serving as a philosophy of national unity. Pancasila is ideological in

its meaning as it aims to promote harmony among diverse population of ethnic groups across Indonesia. At the local level, the application of Pancasila principles is somewhat successful. However, one should not unilaterally comprehend Pancasila only in politics, religion philosophy nor economy. The multiplicity of perspectives on the meaning and strategic position of Pancasila leads to a contest of meanings. A contest that goes beyond a national debate and actually raises tensions and conflicts. It thus contradicts the intentions of Pancasila as an answer to intolerance and radicalism in Indonesia. This study uses literature studies of researches on ethnoreligious conflict, separatism and Pancasila.

Keywords: Pancasila; religious intolerance; secessionism; national unity

Introduction

In Indonesia, a country with an overwhelming majority of Muslims, the state ideology of Pancasila is meant to reunite the ethnic, religious, racial and inter-group diversity. Nevertheless, just as is happening within Southeast Asian countries, the Indonesian national unity is affected by religious conflicts, secessionism and communal violence (Croissant & Trinn, 2009; Sidel, 2012; Kosuta 2017). The imbalance between unity and disunity particularly exists around the integrations of Aceh and Papua. The secessionist conflict in Aceh came to an end with a peace agreement between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian Government in 2005 (Aspinall, 2008). Meanwhile, an armed secessionist conflict has been continuing in Papua, where it coincides with the division of identity and social classes. In this paper identity is understood as the diversity of religious identities (such as Christian and Islamic) and cultural ones (such as Papuan, Moluccan etc.). Religion and culture are difficult to isolate from other, e.g., ethnic, social or national, dimensions of diversity. Intolerance and separatism do express the need for an identity reflected in one's own culture and religion. In Indonesia identities are constructed locally (not all members of island communities favour a national identity or have trust in the state ideology of Pancasila) in their own way; there is a revival of local cultures, religions and political independence aspirations, despite or possibly precisely because of Pancasila.

In the last five years, Papua has emerged as the center of violence, among others visible in the 2014 Paniai – and the 2018 Nduga incident. The Paniai incident represents the shooting of 4 Papuan students by Indonesian military when they protested the military persecutions toward students in the Paniai district of Papua. The Nduga incident refers to the executions by the West Papuan Liberation Army

to 16 Indonesian civilians who worked in road construction in Nduga regency of Papua. Papua, formerly the Netherlands New Guinea, experiences massive development and transmigration policy under Indonesian rule. These practices do make Papuan natives more marginalized, and their number decreases due to the influx of migrant populations from other Indonesian islands. The results are that more coastal districts and cities in Papua land are inhabited by people with a diversity of cultural and religious orientations, living side by side (Upton, 2009; Tirtosudarmo, 2020).

If we identify a set of communal conflicts involving religious issues then the nature of these conflicts do change from violence to communal tension. Deutsch (1973, p. 14) speaks of a latent conflict of religious intolerance and radicalism. However, nowadays these two phenomena occur prominent in cyberspace in the form of hate speech and the proliferation of hoaxes prior to and during the election or post-conflict local election. Altogether, the actual and virtual tensions are a challenge to national unity in Indonesia. A number of conflict studies, especially on religious and ethnic-based communal violence in Indonesia, have been carried out by both domestic and foreign researchers. Lim's study (2017, p. 5-10) shows that the Indonesian Internet space is used for spreading false news and hate speech. Today, the topic of religious-based intolerance is the mainstream in the study of conflict in Indonesia. Liddle (1996) writes of the Islamist turn in Indonesia, that is to say, the development of a more religious orientation among the middle class prior to the end of the New Order. The New Order is a political period when Indonesia was under authoritarian rules of General Suharto from 1967 to 1998. Van Bruinessen (2013) recognizes a rise of religious conservatism, which strengthens the turn towards Islamism and the development of a more fundamentalist religious orientation. The studies on religious intolerance in Indonesia conducted by Menchik (2016) and Menchik & Trost (2018) are stating that tolerance in Indonesia is based on communal rights. Indonesian Muslims are no more and no less tolerant than Muslims in other countries. The crisis of religious tolerance is, however, an effect of the fading culture of tolerance based on national communalism. Hadiz (2017) explains that the emergence of political Islam, next to a weakening communalism, is more due to the characteristics of Indonesia's neo-liberal democracy. The political Islamic groups emerges, in reaction to the global and local oligarchic capitalism, by exercising the religious identity in politics.

Although various reconciliation efforts have been carried out by the Indonesian Government, religious and political conflicts still emerge in Indonesia. The above-mentioned studies do not consider Pancasila as the source of practical values useful to resolve the ongoing conflicts and communal tensions. We are of the opinion that it is due to the opposing interpretations of Pancasila during both the Old Order, Indonesian rule under President Sukarno (1959-1967), and the New Order regime, Indonesian administration under President Suharto (1967-1998).

Sukarno, host of the Bandung Conference, conceived that Pancasila values were consistent with communist ideology due to the second value of Pancasila, namely the recognition of humanity. In turn, Suharto argued that Pancasila principles were inconsistent with communist ideology because the first value of Pancasila demands religiosity and the belief in one God. It is interesting to notice that Pancasila can be interpreted as both consistent and inconsistent with communism, as though Pancasila were a token of a true contradiction. The opposing interpretations brings us to describe to what extent the values of Pancasila can or cannot be used as a conceptual framework to overcome religious intolerance and separatist conflict in a national context, while at the same time promoting the values of plurality in global society. As written before the argument of this study is that Pancasila has failed to serve as a philosophy of national unity to promote tolerance and peace because the basic nature of the conflicts is not only ideological. Another concern is the different interpretations of Pancasila by political Islamic groups and secular nationalists.

Intolerance and Separatism

Martin van Bruinessen (2013, p. 17) concludes that the religious style in Indonesia since at least 2005 has moved in a conservative direction. What exactly does the anthropologist Van Bruinessen mean by conservatism? Conservatism refers to a number of movements that reject modernist, liberal or progressive reinterpretations in Islamic teachings and believe in the importance of established social doctrines and rules. In this context, Van Bruinessen also defines religious fundamentalism as the strict, literal interpretation of religion. The two categories of conservatism and religious fundamentalism reject a hermeneutic interpretation of religious sacred writings. In addition fundamentalists can also reject conservative practices at once if they believe that the practice has no basis in various religious sacred writings.

In addition to conservatism and religious fundamentalism, radicalism is closely related to increased intolerance. Religious radicalism stems from politicization of faith. It means various forms of religious interpretation, all of which encourage all adherents to encourage, actively and passively, the replacement of the prevailing political system in a country (Nadzir et al., 2017). The common understanding of radicalism is usually identified with terror groups such as Al Qaeda or ISIS because these groups have been posing some real, ideological and violent threats to many countries in the name of religious radicalism. Intolerant characteristics can be found in radical groups in their efforts to change the political and religious orientations and structures within the state.

Political change is the aim of several separatist movements. According to Ted Gurr (2015) these movements do have a strong like with ethnicity. Gurr speaks of ethno-nationalists, large groups with a history and dream of autonomy; indigenous peoples, conquered descendants of original inhabitants; ethno-classes, low-status minorities descended from slaves or immigrants; militant sects, communities politically defined by religion; and communal contenders, culturally distinct groups seeking to improve their position. If some politically active ethnic groups, as a result of discrimination, use force to achieve their goals, then political scientist Gurr calls this ethno-political conflict. In this particular sense of Indonesia, Papuans are indeed indigenous people and ethnic nationalists who expressed already during the colonial oppression by the Netherlands their wish for independency. A claim which was later based on the Dutch promise of independence to Papuans in the 1960s. The dream for an independent Papua has never fade away despite the Indonesian military interventions and the so-called Act of Free Choice, the 1969 controversial referendum in which 1,025 people selected by the Indonesian military voted in favor of Indonesian control in Papua (Chauvel, 2004; Drooglever, 2009). Conflicts in Papua include ethno-political dimensions because they seek to reclaim independence in military and political terms. There is also an economic motivation behind the recent conflict stimulated by the competition for resources between international, national and local actors, as seen in the Intan Jaya Regency, which is known for gold mining.

Development of Conflicts and Intolerance in Indonesia

We especially refer to the inter-religious communal conflicts between the Muslim and Christian communities that occurred in Ambon and Poso, both claiming a significant number of lives (Varshney et al., 2004; Van Klinken, 2005), between 1999-2004. The Ambon and Poso conflicts have many similarities (Schulze, 2017). Both communal conflicts manipulated the symbols and identity of Islam and Christianity with the aim to mobilize people. The conflicts involved the Laskar Jihad, who comes from outside Ambon and Poso. The clashes turned into a national issue. Both conflicts have ended through the establishment of the Malino I and Malino II Agreements signed by Muslim and Christian leaders, who control the grassroots communities, from the two feuding regions. The way in which the national government resolved the violent religious conflict peacefully, has its roots in Pancasila values. Namely a human and democratic approach to the dialogue, wisdom expressed in the deliberations and this all inspired by the motto *bhineka tunggal ika* (unity and diversity) (Lindawaty, 2016). Therefore, Pancasila, especially its fourth principle, does promote some consensual dialogues and diversity at a local level.

The more recent developments of religious conservatism coincide with the emergence of religious intolerance in Indonesia in which the majority of citizens is Sunni. The persecution of minority religious groups, such as the Islamic Shia and Jemaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) in the period 1999-2012, does mark a shift in the characteristics of communal conflict from inter-religious to intra-religious. The persecution of the Ahmadiyah community in Lombok began in 1999 and resumed in 2004-2005. It compelled 36 families to seek refuge in the Transito Dormitory. When the attack on another Shia community occurred in 2012 in Sampang, members were forced to flee to the Rusunawa Puspoagro, Sidoarjo (Afdillah, 2013, p. 1). Ever since then, the Government has not provided certainty about the status of refugees and their future, because the process of reconciliation at the grassroots has not yet been accomplished and legal repercussions have not been incurred by the perpetrators (Pamungkas, 2017, p. 5).

The two national conflicts contain complex dimensions ranging from different interpretations of religious texts to the sociological contexts of the competing elite organizations. However, the global context of Sunni-Shi'a conflict and increasing religious conservatism at the national level have also played a role in triggering violence against the Siite community. A main barrier for a dialogue of reconciliation between Sunni and Shi'a are their theologies. Shi'a followers believe that Islam should be led by descendants of prophet Muhammad, while Sunnis believe

that the leader of Islam should be appointed by election and consensus. Local reconciliation would be possible using a cultural approach (Mundzakkir, 2018, p. 152-153) and without addressing the different dimensions of theological beliefs. However, reconciliation based on a human rights protection approach to minority groups is difficult to achieve, not because the national Government does not want to implement it because of the sensitive religious relations between the local Sunni and Shi'a communities. Reconciliation based on a theological approach is not easy because of the fundamental differences in religious beliefs (Mundzakkir, 2018, p. 152-153). A cultural approach would be possible considering the fact that the kinship between the refugees and their counterparts has been maintained (Akmaliah, 2018, p. 121-123). This can be concluded from the visits of refugees to their hometown for family events, or visits to take care of their agricultural land, although they are not allowed to stay long in order to avoid conflicts (Pamungkas 2018a, p. 6).

The characteristics of the post 2016 conflict shifted from the persecution of religious minorities to the nationwide development of intolerance and radicalism. Intolerance is an attitude of rejecting the social and political rights of different groups. Radicalism is a religious interpretation that, in the Indonesian context, aims to replace the secular political system by Islamic Caliphate (Nadzir et al., 2017). These developments are clearly a threat to social cohesion and national unity. The use of identity politics in the 2017 DKI (Jakarta Special Capital Region) Governor Election further stirred the development of intolerance movements towards minority groups in other regions (Pamungkas & Hakam, 2019, p. 68-70). Much different from the more political balanced conditions in the 2007 and 2012 elections, the 2017 election was characterized by clashes, beatings and hate speech. There was a common tendency to reject political leaders from different religious or ethnic groups. The LIPI (Indonesian Institute of Sciences) conducted research in 2018 in provinces where Muslims are the majority population. This research found religious-based intolerance phenomena across several provinces in 2018, due to rising Islamic fundamentalism ahead of the 2019 national election (Pamungkas et al., 2018b). After the 2019 national election, the issue of religious intolerance seemed to decline gradually. The Government has since banned two intolerant and radical Islamic organisations, i.e. *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* (HTI) and the Islamic Defender Front or *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI).

Table 1.   Intolerance Phenomena in Indonesia during 2018

No.	Provinces	Intolerance Phenomena
1.	Aceh	The increasing political influence and power of Islamic traditional conservative organizations.
2.	Sumatera Utara	The use of identity politics in the North Sumatra Governor Election, the governor's voter segregation based on religion and ethnicity in the regencies of Mandailing-South Tapanuli (Islam), Malay-East Sumatra (Islam) and Batak-Tapanulis & Nias (Christian).
3.	Banten	Prohibition of the establishment of worship houses of minority religious groups and the exhibition of certain religious symbols in public and political spaces from the district level to the provincial stage.
4.	DKI Jakarta	The exploitation of identity politics in the DKI Jakarta elections.
5.	Jawa Barat	The Masyumi's, an Islamic political party which used to clash for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia through parliamentary struggles in between 1945-1960. *Darul Islam,* a para-military movement, which used to fight for the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic State movement, and they rebelled against the Indonesian government in between 1948-1962. Their legacies are still embedded in the mind of Muslim activists in West Java, and it emerged into the 212 action (The 2nd December 2016 rally of Islamic groups demanding the prosecution of Governor Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) for insulting the Chapter al-Maidah verse 51 in the Holy Qur'an)
6.	Jawa Tengah	Central Java, especially the Solo Residency, is the home-grown for conservative groups.
7.	DIY	Yogyakarta has been constantly experiencing a change from city of harmony to city of intolerance.
8.	Jawa Timur	The discourse and network of intolerant groups have been infiltrating into the largest Islamic organization, i.e. Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
9.	Sulawesi Selatan	The Islamist movements which wish to implement the Islamic sharia have been weakening in the South Sulawesi province. However, these movements transform into anti-Shi'a groups by dispersing Shi'a followers' activities.

Source: Pamungkas et al. (2018b) (this research relates to the 2018 LIPI research)

Regarding the separatist conflict, the political reform in 1998 unfortunately did not stop the cycle of political violence carried out by the Indonesian state in the land of Papua (Al Rahab, 2016, p. 19). In the period 2000-2004, there were a number of incidents of political violence that attracted international attention, namely the Abepura case in December 2000, the 2001 murder of Theys Eluay, the Wasior case in June 2002, the 2003 Wamena case and the Mulia riots in 2004. Political violence also emerged as the Government's response to the ongoing protests of Amungme people against land acquisition by Freeport McMoran. The company acquired the land through various innovative and manipulative methods during the New Order (Pamungkas, 2005, 2009, p. 53-54). The aforementioned incidents do show inconsistency and the lack of commitment of the Government in preserving or nurturing peace in the Land of Papua, and thereby diminishing the meaning of Papua's Special Autonomy. It also adds to the *memoria passionis* that has been accumulating since Papua's integration into Indonesia in 1960s. Most studies (Brundige et al., 2004; Elmslie, 2003; Elmslie & Webb-Gannon, 2013; King, 2004) mention that the state, through its security forces combating separatist movements and through the absence of public services, is the source of Papuan unsafety (Anderson, 2015).

Violations of civil and political rights

To respond to the aspirations of Papuan independence, at that time President Habibie held a dialogue with local leaders in 1999. However, in contrast to the Papuan aspirations, the President and the Parliament enacted Law No. 45/1999 which sets the legal foundation for the division of Irian Jaya into the West Irian Jaya and Central Irian Jaya Provinces. This division is widely rejected in Papua because it does not address the demand for complete independence. The next Government under president Abdurrahman Wahid changed the name of Irian Jaya to Papua and allowed the raising of the Morning Star flag as long as it is flown lower than the Indonesian flag. He was the only president who succeeded in appeasing most Papuan people during his administration (Chauvel, 2006, p. 200-212). In 2002, president Megawati adopted Law No. 21/2001 concerning Papua's Special Autonomy, the drafting of which had been carried out during president Wahid. Papuan Special Autonomy is the result of negotiations between the Government and a few Papuan political elites. Consequently, the absence of negotiations with broader elements

of the Papuan people, including the West Papua National Liberation Army, has implied only a little support for such special autonomy. This autonomy just represented the unilateral concession of Jakarta, and it is not relevant to the strategy for overcoming the separatist movement (McGibbon, 2004, p. viii; Chairullah, 2019, p. 149-150).

In 2012, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration established the Acceleration of Development Unit for the Provinces of Papua and West Papua (UP4B) to coordinate the development programs for those two provinces. Nevertheless, this unit does not have adequate authority to direct the ministry's program in Tanah Papua (Viartasiwi, 2014, p. 283-304). Finally, president Jokowi dismissed this unit in early 2015 (Aritonang, 2014). During his first term, president Jokowi brought a new hope to create perpetual peace in Papua. However, he has not yet succeeded in delivering his promise to put an end to political violence there.

As of 2018, political violence in Papua shows no signs of an end. As shown in the following table some categories of violence are increasing and others are growing but the repression does not stop. The increasing number of categories are included the number of reported torture, reported and victims of extra judicial killing, political arrests, and violence against human right defenders.

Tabel 2. Violations of Civil and Political Rights in the Land of Papua

Civil and political rights data	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Cases of violence/arrests/threats against local journalists	12	20	18	5	8	10	2	5	2
Cases of violence/deportation/intimidation/obstruction of foreign journalists and observers providing coverage on Papua- related issues in Indonesia	2	0	2	4	0	3	2	0	0
Number of reported torture/maltreatment cases	28	30	76	19	20	32	21	22	34
Number of reported torture/maltreatment victims	99	67	135	244	64	184	55	126	89
Number of reported cases of extrajudicial killings	11	6	8	10	6	10	11	16	16
Number of reported victims of extrajudicial killings	18	8	12	14	6	10	23	33	25
Number of reported cases of enforced disappearances							2	2	2
Number of reported victims of enforced disappearances							5	6	4
Prosecution of perpetrators (police and military)	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	2	2
Number of political arrests	210	548	370	1083	5361	601	1068	619	384
Number of political prisoners/detainees	40	70	55	57	27	0	25	230	19
Number of public peaceful assemblies/gatherings on Papua-related issues, forcefully intervened by security forces	8	29	14	24	35	13	27	38	37
Violence/threats against human rights defenders	3	1	5	5	2	10	6	8	20
Cases prosecuted with treason charges (Articles 106 and 110 of the Criminal Code)	27	25	31	14	15	0	7	86	18

Sources: ICP (2021)

Since 2019, the attitude of racism towards Papuans has increased according to members of organizations for Papuan students in Surabaya, Malang, Yogyakarta and Semarang (Koman, 2020, p. 8). The most significant case took place in Surabaya in 2019 when a group of militia, accompanied by police and military, uttered racist statements and raided the Papuan student ashram. The reason of this raiding was due to the disappearance of the Indonesian flag before Independence Day on August 17. Without evidence, the militias claimed that Papuan students deliberately throw out the flag. A number of large-scale rallies in the land of Papua were mounted which caused victims and destroyed a number of properties. Security officers detained 87 Papuans who were arrested on charges of treason or riots. Both the militia members and Papuans were send to prison but law enforcement was arguable because the militia members only faced 6 months imprisonment, while seven Papuans faced between 10-17 months in prison.

So far, we can conclude as follows. Since the 1998 Indonesia's reformation, the history of intergroup conflict in the country has been dynamic. It brought about a shift in the nature of conflict from communal violence to persecution of minority religious groups. Political changes in 1998 prompted the competing local elites to negotiate their political interests through mobilizing ethnic or religious issues in local politics (Klinken, 2007). This provided the context of communal violence between religious or ethnic groups in the 1999-2004 period. After 2004, the persecution of minority religious groups emerged. After 2016, the characteristics of conflict shifted to an increasingly open intolerant attitude of the majority towards other minority religious groups at their provinces. Moreover, there has been armed conflict, some of which has been relatively constant, such as the separatist conflict in Papua. A repressive security approach accompanied by exploitative economic development is not the answer to overcoming the separatist movement. The West Papua Liberation National Army did not aim to secede but to reclaim the independence "assumed to exist" but seized by the Indonesian state in 1965. Therefore, they consider Indonesia to be the colonial state.

It is clear that, despite of the ideology of Pancasila, there are many conflicts between the Indonesian state and its citizens and between citizens themselves. In view of this conflicting context, the question arises if and how Pancasila, as a philosophy of national unity, is able to contribute to more cohesion.

Pancasila as a Common Denominator

Pancasila is a set of philosophical foundations of the Indonesian state, formulated by the founding fathers before the declaration of independence in 1945 in order to support national unity and the relations between citizens. It consists of five principles: belief in one God, just and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom in unanimity out of deliberations amongst representatives, and social justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia (Nishimura, 2014, p. 303). These principles provide the fundamental philosophy for national unity. However, the escalation of communal conflicts, oppression of religious minorities, intolerance and political violence against Papuans and other citizens indicate a lack of respect for the values of Pancasila by both the state and its citizens. A better national unity requires more tolerance and civic education in the country.

Yudi Latief, the former Head of the Pancasila Ideology Development Board (BPIP), stressed that Pancasila is philosophically relevant as a foundation for overcoming various social problems including current social conflicts (Nugrahaeni, 16 November 2019). Pancasila directs democracy and Government in the principle, which says, "Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives." This fourth principle is flanked by the third principle, which urges "the unity of Indonesia" and the fifth principle of "social justice for all Indonesians" (Nugrahaeni, 16 November 2019).

Multiple studies and practical experiences demonstrate that religion is ambiguous. It can obstruct and construct cohesion and national unity. Religion can stimulate inter- and intra-religious collaboration, be of value for community building and contribute to cohesion. Inspired by the third principle of Pancasila, which advocates national unity, it could be considered to start a network of religious groups in order to improve tolerance via inter- and intra-religious dialogue. In the case of Papua, for example, a network of the Indonesian Muslim migrants from mainly Java and the Christian Papuans is a tool for building trust in the 'other'. Intolerance is mostly pertinent to exclusive social and religious communities. This is confirmed by the study of Tropp et al. (2006) and Schlueter & Scheepers (2010) which revealed that intergroup contact would encourage cohesion and decrease exclusionary reactions in different groups. Face-to-face encounters do help to reduce intergroup violence and prejudices.

The Asia Foundation (TAF), The Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (PMK) and the Institute for Assessing and Developing Human Resources (Lakspesdam NU) have encouraged more inclusive interaction between

the Ahmadiyah refugees and their surrounding communities. A social inclusion program in 2017 provides an example of how to implement Pancasila's values in reconciling the Ahmadiyah refugees in Mataram (Pamungkas, 2018). However, the Ahmadiyah refugees should decrease their religious expressions in the public sphere so that they could mingle with the surrounding society. The 2017 program does not exhibit significant progress in Sampang, Madura, except that the Shi'a refugees may now visit their own place of origin (Mundzakkir, 2018, p. 151-182). Although the Lakspesdam NU did not explicitly mentioned Pancasila values, their way of reconciling the Ahmadiyah and Sunni Muslim communities was based on the Pancasila principles. Especially with a focus on civilized humanity and the social justice for the completely Indonesian people. As shown here and, in the case of the Malino I and Malino II Agreements, the Pancasila principles do have the strength to promote dialogue and reconciliation.

Pancasila has relevance as an instrument for conflict resolutions in Indonesia; however, the principles of Pancasila are challenged by the continuously intertwined inter- and intra-religious conflicts and the politics around them. Despite efforts to enshrine Islam as the basis of the state ideology during the Suharto era, Muslim political organizations had to face the New Order's de-politicization of Islam. It was only under strong pressure of the Suharto administration that Pancasila was accepted as the single philosophy of national unity. The multiple interpretations of the principles of Pancasila continue to raise a fierce debate on national identity around the question 'are we a secular or Islamic state?'. Among the Pancasila principles of monotheism, justice, deliberative democracy, national unity and social welfare, the affirmation of "one God" is controversial.

The principles of Pancasila do call for unity in diversity. As such, it aims to construct, after colonialism, a national identity for a country that since its beginning has confronted with conflicts around territory and religion. The framework of Pancasila is above the particularity of individual and group ideologies. In the private domain consisting of family and community, each individual and group has the space and freedom to develop their particular ideology (religious, political etc.). However, in public space, all groups ought to prioritize Pancasila as the social cement to cohere despite the various personal and sectarian preferred opinions. The practice of Pancasila in supporting equality through participation of all citizens is more meaningful than a comprehensive doctrine as it was in the time of Suharto and Sukarno's administrations. On the one hand, Sukarno took for granted the coherency and consistency between Pancasila and communism. On the other hand, Suharto argued in that Pancasila is incoherent and inconsistent with communism. Therefore, putting Pancasila as a comprehensive doctrine

leaves it merely as a tool to justify the political and economic interests of parties, no matter how sound and unsound their justifications are.

Conflicts, latent or manifest, do take place between groups with different identities. In principle, these groups can simultaneously share the fundamental values of Pancasila. Pancasila could be the basis of conflict resolution because it touches the basic values of various social and religious groups. These values are foundational to communities and they are embedded in the hearts of most, if not all, Indonesians (Widjojo, 1 June 2021). There can be disagreement based on religious identity, but Indonesian Muslims and Christians share the dimensions of Pancasila ('Menteri Agama RI,' 18 May 2020). However, the conflict in the Land of Papua has a different character because the indigenous Papuans were not involved in the struggle for Indonesian independence including in the formulation of Pancasila (Lokobal, 31 August 2022).

The essence of Pancasila is "*gotong royong*" (mutual assistance or mutual help), in which there is solidarity, the contribution of all parties, unity and common interests. The principles of Bandung are a reflection of the values of Pancasila (Seran, 2016, p. 41-42: Fatharani, 2021, p. 30). As an example of the paramount value, 'gotong royong' is the basis of the principles of advancing common interests through cooperation, resolving international problems peacefully, and recognizing the equality of all nations and ethnic groups. Therefore, implementing Pancasila values means realizing simultaneously the ten principles of Banding in support of peace and the fight against so-called neo-colonialism and imperialism. 'Gotong royong' is consistent with the spirit of diversity in the third principle of Pancasila (Fadillah, 21 November 2012). President Sukarno and his supporters, mainly secular nationalist groups who are close to socialist or communist groups, claim this Pancasila interpretation. In contrast, political Islamic groups are likely to consider the first principle of monotheism as Pancasila's essence, not 'gotong royong' or 'unity'.

The multiple interpretations of the principles of Pancasila provide a public debate on national identity, for instance around the question 'are we a secular or Islamic state?' Further radicalization and intolerance are a risk to national unity and to the coexistence of groups with diverse identities. Diversity and unity do indicate a paradox in terms of being seemingly contradictory yet interdependent elements. However, concerns for diversity need to be connected with unity. The principles of Pancasila do have the potential to stimulate the advantages of both diversity and unity while declining their downsides. Pancasila provides a basis for national debate and dialogue. Especially in a context of radicalization and intolerance, an effort is needed to strengthen the shared cognizance of the values of

Pancasila through stellar examples provided by the first generation of Indonesian leaders. Pancasila is an ideal ideology for the Indonesian people because its principles epitomize the unity of the diverse backgrounds of Indonesians, the diversity of their religious beliefs and plurality of their community find its foundations. The founding fathers and mothers abandoned all these differences by establishing Pancasila. The Pancasila ideology therefore has open characteristics, and it selectively filters foreign ideologies (Sudjito et al., 2018, p. 73).

National and global dynamics

The principles of Pancasila are able to reduce the dis-unifying sensitivities around religion. The idea of an Islamic version of the Indonesian state is very popular. A number of recent studies (Seftiani et al., 2020) report that a person's degree of identification with their religion and ethnicity along with their socioeconomic status has a significant indirect effect on their intolerance and radicalism through all intermediate variables. It means that, the higher level of identification of one's religion and ethnicity, the more intolerant and radical he or she will be due. It could be because of the feeling of threat from other religious or ethnic groups. It breeds having distrust towards other religious and ethnic groups, showing high levels of religiocentrism, low levels of secularization, and the utilization of social media accompanied with illiteracy (Seftiani et al., 2020, p. 66-68).

This finding reinforces theoretical propositions provided by the Ethnic Group Conflict Theory (Scheepers et al., 2002; Gijsbert et al., 2004). This theory claims that a higher level of perceived threat (or a perceived group threat) by other religious or ethnic groups leads to process in-group identification and de-identification of others (out-groups). Pamungkas (2015, p. 331-333) and Subagya (2015, p. 226-227) have argued that there is distrust, religiocentrism and negative attitudes toward religious diversity and fundamentalism, all expressions of inner determinants besides the feeling of being threatened. These studies find that feeling threatened by out-group members in economic, political and cultural fields is the most significant determinant supporting exclusionary attitudes. The feeling of being threatened arises because of relative deprivation, which is the gap between what is ideal and what is happening both in religious, economic, political and cultural life (Gurr, 2016, p. 24). This is contrary to the principles of Pancasila especially regarding social justice for all Indonesians. Especially religiocentrism is at odds with Pancasila that purposes not be confrontational to religions.

The challenge is to restore a peaceful atmosphere of religious life and mutual respect for differences. Religions require Pancasila to resolve their limitations in accepting the 'other', achieving the common good and reducing deep-seated barriers that have the potential to trigger conflicts. We suspect that one common limitation is that most, if not all, fundamentalist or radical religious groups compel its followers to be either fanatic or overzealous. Mutual consensus based on Pancasila can cover this deficiency (Hanif, 2019, p. 130-131). Moreover, Siswanto (2019, p. 55-58) argues that, along with the development of globalization and changes in international economic and political order, Pancasila needs revitalization to fit the current national and global dynamics. This revitalization aims to restore the values of Pancasila into the hearts of Indonesian people. For example, by talking about whether the extent of the free market economy in Indonesia is in accordance with the values of Pancasila, especially Pancasila's principle of social justice for all Indonesian people. We observe that the current Indonesian economic system is a free market and liberal economy dictated by a smaller number of oligarchs. It certainly contradicts the principle of social justice for all Indonesian people. Another question is whether the electoral system is consistent with the fourth principle in Pancasila, deliberation to reach agreement. This question is essential because the so-called democratic elections in Indonesia only create political oligarchy, strengthen authoritarianism and weaken freedom of expression. Kankindi (2017) states that political participation in Western liberal democracy follows the principle of the survival of the fittest; the fittest are associated with big money. Such liberal democracy comes from Western countries and is not in accord with Pancasila values. Especially the conflict in Papua brought about by economic exploitation via the mining in Freeport.

Conflict between Pancasila and Bandung Principles

Based on the previous paragraphs, we conclude that ongoing conflicts based on ethnic or religious primordial sentiments, intolerance and separatism determined the social situation of the Indonesian people after the 1998 reformation. The values of Pancasila as the basis of state ideology are mostly symbolic and normative but do not enliven the life of Indonesian society, nation and state. As a state ideology, in our opinion, Pancasila is dead because the practices of administering state power are far from the values contained in Pancasila. Therefore, as a result, Pancasila cannot be a binder in relations between religious or ethnic communities when injustice occurs in the structures of power and resource sharing that creates

relative deprivation. Pancasila values are visible in the daily life of the Indonesian people, such as cooperation and helping each other in the grassroots community. However, state rulers and political elites do not fully practice Pancasila in governance. They are more inclined to think about their personal, family and class interests than the public interest. Therefore, there is a gap between the mass and its elites in practicing Pancasila values (Wahyu, 1 June 2022).

Pancasila's values, as mentioned above, have indeed conceptually imbued the Bandung principles. In their own country, Indonesia, the state leaders have made it an ideological slogan but have not practised it correctly according to the founding fathers' aspirations. We recall President Sukarno's speech at the opening of the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, which contained, among other things, peace, as follows:

> *"There is no task more urgent than maintaining peace. Without peace, our independence is of little use. The restoration and development of our countries will mean very little, and our revolutions will not have the opportunity to continue their journey" (Utama, 2017, p. 249).*

The spirit of the Bandung Principles, as a reflection of the values of Pancasila, really values and embeds peace in relations between diverse groups of people or nations. However, this peaceful situation borrowing Galtung's (1969) conception of a negative or positive peace has not yet come to fruition in Indonesia. Violent conflicts have still coloured Papua's situation from 1965 until now. While social welfare has increased rapidly compared to the early days of independence, inequality for the Papua citizens is still very high.

Another content of President Sukarno's speech was about the relationship between various religious groups concerning peace. The president said:

> *Religion has a significant position, especially in this part of our world. Presumably, there are more religions here than in any other area of the earth. Nevertheless, once again, our countries are the birthplace of religions. Should we be divided because of the diversity in our religious life? Each religion has its history, peculiarities, nation d'etre, and the particular truths it wishes to promulgate. But if we do not realize that all major religions are the same in their message to prioritize tolerance and in their advice to practice the principle of living and allowing life, if the followers of every religion are not prepared to in the same way respect the rights of others everywhere, If every state does not fulfil its obligation to give equal rights to adherents of all faiths – if all these are not implemented, then reli-*

gion will be degraded, and its true purpose will be polluted and distorted (Utama, 2017, p. 243).

As mentioned earlier, 54 years after Indonesia's independence, conflicts between ethnic-religious groups emerged openly in 1999 after the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime. The spirit of the Bandung Principles is that the state gives equal rights to all believers to worship according to their beliefs. The conflict between religious groups in Indonesia that occurred at the beginning of the 1998 reformation was marked by the use of religious symbols in order to commit violence against other parties. The conflict seemed to occur because of religious differences, but in reality, the conflict actors were political entrepreneurs who competed by exploiting religious symbols to gain power (Klinken, 2007). Most political elites forget Pancasila's values and the Bandung Principles' spirit. Those values and principles do not become a reference for public ethics or ethics in the administration of power (Ardi, 2017).

Finally, one of the essential points in President Sukarno's speech at the opening of the 1955 KAA regarded the rejection of colonialism:

How is it possible for us to be silent about colonialism? For us, colonialism is not something far away. We know him in all his cruelty. We have seen how much it causes great damage to humanity, how much it is abandoned, and if it is, in the end, reluctantly expelled or expelled by the irresistible journey of history. My people and the people of various Asian and African countries know this because we have experienced it ourselves (Utama, p. 249).

The speech shows that the spirit of the Bandung Principle is anti-colonialism. However, the reality occurs in Papua; the relationship between the central Government and the Papuan people resembles internal colonialism (Kusumaryati, 2018, pp. 1-3). One feature arising from the inherent nature of colonialization is the greater dominance of the military and police in political and economic policies. In addition, the policy of transmigration of people from outside Papua has caused indigenous Papuans to become a minority in coastal areas. Finally, Papua has seen the exploitation of natural resources on a large scale, the benefits of which are enjoyed mainly by investors from outside Papua (Sudira et al., 2020, pp. 19-20). Meanwhile, violent conflict continues between the West Papua National Liberation Army and the Indonesian security forces, causing civilian casualties and refugees. So far, the idealistic principles of Pancasila do meet their limits here.

Conclusion

Pancasila Principles do contribute to promote dialogue and diversity in local levels like the ones in Ambon and Poso. However, we conclude that Pancasila fails to serve as a philosophy of unity to promote tolerance and peace on a national level because the nature of conflict is not only ideological but originates more in social and political injustices. Another problem is that the interpretation of Pancasila is always determined by the ruling political regime and, consequently, the interpretation of the five Pancasila Principles changes during all political periods. Since Pancasila has not been implemented thoughtfully by the political regimes in power, the state ideology has not realized the life of the people envisioned by the founding founders. Political regimes follow the interest of their parties rather than that of the people.

On the phenomenon of religious intolerance and the ongoing conflict of separatism, we observe that the application of Pancasila values does not follow the spirit of the Bandung Principle, namely a commitment to open dialogue based on mutual respect and achieving mutual benefits. A dialogue to resolve problems peacefully is fundamental to the Bandung Principles. Although such principles aimed for a global context then, they are still relevant for use at the national and local level today. The increase in religious intolerance, for example, occurred because the tradition of dialogue between different religious leaders, who lived during the colonial period, disappeared after Indonesia's independence. The Government exacerbated this in the New Order era, which did not allow traditions to disagree.

Finally, we observe that the violent conflict in Papua has never ended since its integration with Indonesia in 1963. Papuan church leaders in Papua wonder why the Indonesian Government was willing to have a dialogue with the Free Aceh Movement in 2005 but has not been willing to have a dialogue with the Free Papua Movement. The Indonesian Government could resolve the violent conflict in Papua through dialogue and negotiation with the leaders of the Papuan independence movement. By not implementing Pancasila values, the Government does not commit to dialogue to achieve the peace that is the essence of the Pancasila and Bandung Principles. Dialogue also is a space to correct stigmatization and racism against Papuan natives. The dialogue between Jakarta and Papua also represents the dialogue between races, in this case Malay and Melanesian. It is hoped that an improved application of the principles of Pancasila will serve the living conditions for both Indonesians and Papuans.

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